We define the model of an abstract economy with differential asymmetric information and a measure space of agents. We generalize N. C. Yannelis's result 2007 , considering that each agent is characterised by a random preference correspondence instead of having a random utility function. We establish two different equilibrium existence results.
Introduction
We define the model of an abstract economy with asymmetric information and a measure set of agents, each of which is characterized by a private information set, an action strategy correspondence, a random constraint correspondence, and a random preference correspondence. The preference correspondences need not be representable by utility functions. The equilibrium concept is an extension of the deterministic equilibrium. We also present the model of Yannelis see 1 in which the agents maximize their expected utilities. Our model is a generalization of Yannelis's model.
A purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of equilibrium for an abstract economy with differential information and a measure space of agents. The assumptions on correspondences refer to upper semicontinuity and measurable graph. We use in this paper several results on the continuity and measurability of the set of integrable selections from a Banach-valued correspondences.
The model of an abstract economy with differential asymmetric information captures the meaning of trades under uncertainty. All economic activity in a society is made under conditions of uncertainty incomplete information . The asymmetric information in the Arrow-Debreu model was introduced by Radner 2 . In his model each agent has his own private information set which is described by a partition of an exogenously given set of states of nature. The information partition of each agent generates a σ-algebra, and his net trades are measurable with respect to it this σ-algebra . Thus, optimal choices reflect the private information of each agent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some notational and terminological conventions are given. We also present, for the reader's convenience, some results on Bochner integration. In Section 3, Yannelis's expected utility model of differential information abstract economy and his main result in 1 are presented. Section 4 introduces our model, that is, the abstract economy with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. Section 5 contains existence results for upper semicontinuous correspondences.
Mathematical Preliminaries

Notation and Definition
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notation:
1 R denotes the set of strictly positive reals, 2 coA denotes the convex hull of the set A, 3 coA denotes the closed convex hull of the set A, 4 2 A denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A,
For the reader's convenience, we review a few basic definitions and results from continuity and measurability of correspondences, Bochner integrable functions, and the integral of a correspondence.
Let X and Y be sets.
Let X, Y be topological spaces and let Φ : X → 2 Y be a correspondence.
Lemma 2.2 see 3 . Let X and Y be two topological spaces and let
A be an open subset of X.
is also upper semicontinuous.
Abstract and Applied Analysis
3 Let now Ω, F, μ be a complete, finite measure space, and let Y be a topological space.
Recall see Debreu 4 , page 359 that if Φ : Ω → 2 Y has a measurable graph, then Φ is lower measurable. Furthermore, if Φ · is closed valued and lower measurable, then Φ : Ω → 2 Y has a measurable graph.
. be a sequence of correspondences with measurable graphs. Then the correspondences n Φ n , n Φ n and Y \ Φ n have measurable graphs.
Let Ω, F, μ be a measure space and Y be a Banach space. It is known see 6, Theorem 2, page 45 that if
We will denote the above set by Φ ω dω or simply Φ.
Moreover, note that if Ω is a complete measure space, Y is a separable Banach space and Φ : Ω → 2 Y is an integrably bounded, nonempty valued correspondence having a measurable graph; then by the Aumann measurable selection theorem we can conclude that S Φ is nonempty and therefore Ω Φ ω dμ ω is nonempty as well.
Let X be a topological space and let Φ : Ω × X → 2 Y be a nonempty valued correspondence.
The results below have been used in the proof of our theorems. For more details and further references see the paper quoted. Theorem 2.8 Projection theorem . Let Ω, F, μ be a complete, finite measure space, and let Y be a complete separable metric space. If H belongs to F ⊗ β Y , its projection Proj Ω H belongs to F. Theorem 2.9 Aumann measurable selection theorem 2 . Let Ω, F, μ be a complete finite measure space, let Y be a complete, separable metric space, and let Φ : Ω → 2 Y be a nonempty valued correspondence with a measurable graph, that is,
Theorem 2.10 Diestel's theorem 2, Theorem 3.1 . Let Ω, F, μ be a complete finite measure space, let X be a separable Banach space, and let Φ : Ω → 2 Y be an integrably bounded, convex, weakly compact and nonempty valued correspondence.
Theorem 2.11 Carathéodory-type selection theorem 5 . Let Ω,F, μ be a complete measure space, let Z be a complete separable metric space, and let Y be a separable Banach space. Let X : Ω → 2 Y be a correspondence with a measurable graph, that is, 
x has a measurable graph and that for each fixed ω ∈ Ω, Φ ω, · : 
2.4
Then for each y ∈ E, ψ ·, y has a measurable graph.
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A Bayesian Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem
We present Yannelis's model 1 of an abstract economy with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. In this model, there is assigned to each agent, in addition to his/her random utility function, a private information set, which is a measurable partition of the exogenously given probability measure space which describes the states of nature of the world .
Let Ω, F, μ be a complete finite measure space, where Ω denotes the set of states of nature of the world and the σ-algebra F denotes the set of events. Let Y be a separable Banach space whose dual has the RNP, denoting the commodity or strategy space. Definition 3.1. A Bayesian abstract economy or social system with differential information and a measure space of agents
interpreted as the strategy set of agent t of the state of nature ω;
x, x t is interpreted as the utility function of agent t, at the state of nature ω, using his/her strategy x t and all other players use the joint strategy x;
ω, x is interpreted as the constraint of agent t, when the state is ω and other agents use the joint strategy x;
4 F t is a sub-σ-algebra of F which denotes the private information of agent t; 5 q t : Ω → R is the prior of agent t, which is a Radon-Nikodym derivative such that Ω q t ω dμ ω 1.
Let S 1 X t {y t ∈ L 1 μ, X : y t, · : Ω → Y be F t -measurable and y t, ω ∈ X t, ω μ-a.e.}. Notice that S 1 X t is the set of all Bocner integrable and F t -measurable selections from the random strategy of agent t. In essence this is the set, out of which agent t will pick his/her optimal choices. In particular, an element x t in S 1 X t is called a strategy for agent t. The typical element of S 1 X t is denoted by x t and that of X t, ω by x t ω . Let S 1
}. An element of S 1 X will be a joint strategy profile. It will be convenient to assume that Ω is a countable set and the σ-algebra F t is generated by a countable partition Λ of Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω, let E t ω in Λ denote the smallest set in F t containing ω and assume that, for each t,
For each t, ω ∈ T × Ω, the interim expected utility of agent t, U t, ω, ·, · :
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The following theorem is the main result of Yannelis in 1 .
Theorem 3.4. Let G be a social system with asymmetric information satisfying (A.1)-(A.4). Then there exists a social equilibrium for G.
One has the following assumptions:
is endowed with the weak topology and X t, ω with the norm topology,
continuous correspondence with closed, convex, and nonempty values.
A.4 The correspondence t → S 1 X t has a measurable graph. Remark 3.5 . This theorem and its proof remain unchanged if the random constraint correspondence is defined as
The Model
We will study the next model of the abstract economy.
Let Ω, F, μ be a complete finite measure space, where Ω denotes the set of states of nature of the world and the σ-algebra F denotes the set of events. Let Y be a separable Banach space whose dual has the RNP, denoting the commodity or strategy space.
Abstract and Applied Analysis 7 Definition 4.1. A Bayesian abstract economy or social system with differential information and a measure space of agents T, τ, υ is a set G { X, F t , A, P , t ∈ T }, where 1 X : T × Ω → 2 Y is the random action strategy correspondence, where, X t, ω ⊂ Y is interpreted as the strategy set of agent t of the state of nature ω;
2 F t is a sub-σ-algebra of F which denotes the private information of agent t;
ii A t, ω, x * ∩ P t, ω, x * ∅μ-a.e. 
Bayesian Equilibrium Existence Theorems
Now we establish an equilibrium existence theorem for Bayesian abstract economies with a measure space of agents and with upper semicontinuous correspondences. Our theorem generalizes Theorem 1 in 1 .
Theorem 5.1. Let T, τ, υ be a measure space of agents and let G { X, F t , A, P , t ∈ T } be a Bayesian abstract economy satisfying (A.1)-(A.5). Then there exists a Bayesian equilibrium for G.
A.1 a X : T × Ω → 2 Y is a nonempty, convex, weakly compact-valued, and integrably bounded correspondence,
b for each t, ω ∈ T × Ω, A t, ω, · : S 1 X → 2 Y is an upper semicontinuous correspondence with closed, convex and nonempty values. a P : T × Ω × S 1 X → 2 Y has a measurable graph, b for each t, ω ∈ T × Ω, P t, ω, · : S 1 X → 2 Y is an upper semicontinuous correspondence with closed, convex, and nonempty values.
We will prove first that S 1 X is nonempty, convex, weakly compact.
Since Ω, F, μ is a complete finite measure space, Y is a separable Banach space and X t, · : Ω → 2 Y has measurable graph, and by Aumann's selection theorem it follows that there exists a function f t, · : Ω → Y such that f t, ω ∈ X t, ω μ-a.e. Since X t, · is integrably bounded, we have that f t, · ∈ L 1 μ, Y , hence S X t is nonempty, and S X t∈T S X t is nonempty. S 1 X t is convex and S 1 X is also convex. Since X t, · : Ω → 2 Y is integrably bounded and has convex weakly compact values, by Diestel's Theorem it follows that S 1 X t is a weakly compact subset of L 1 μ, Y and so is S 1 X . We have that S 1 X is a metrizable set as being a weakly compact subset of the separable Banach space L 1 υ, L 1 μ, Y Dunford-Schwartz 9, page 434 .
Since all the values of the correspondence A are contained in the compact set X ·, · and A is closed and convex valued hence weakly closed , it follows that A is weakly compact valued.
Then Φ is convex valued and for each t, ω ∈ T ×Ω, Φ t, ω, · is upper semicontinuous. We have that Φ ·, ·, x has a measurable graph for each
5.1
For each x ∈ S 1 X , the correspondence G ·, ·, x has a measurable graph.
5.2
9
W is an open set, because U t,ω is open, Φ t, ω, · is an upper semicontinuous map on U t,ω , and the set {x ∈ S 1 X : G t, ω, x ⊂ V } is open since G t, ω, · is u.s.c. Moreover, G is convex and nonempty valued.
Define the correspondence ϕ :
By the measurability lifting theorem Theorem 2.13 , the correspondence t → { y t ∈ L 1 μ, Y : y t, ω ∈ G t, ω, x μ-a.e.} has a measurable graph and so does t → S 1 X t by A.4 . Thus, for each fixed x ∈ S 1 X , ϕ ·, x has a measurable graph. Since for each fixed x ∈ S 1 X , G ·, ·, x has a measurable graph and it is nonempty valued, then by the Aumann measurable selection theorem, it admits a measurable selection and we can conclude that ϕ is nonempty valued. It follows by the u.s.c. lifting theorem that for each fixed t, ϕ t, · is weakly u.s.c.
Define G :
x ν-a.e.}. Another application of the u.s.c. lifting theorem enables us to conclude that G is a weakly u.s.c. correspondence which is obviously convex valued since ϕ is convex valued and also nonempty valued recall once more the Aumann measurable selection theorem and notice that the set S 1 X is metrizable . G is an upper semicontinuous correspondence and has also nonempty convex closed values.
By Fan-Glicksberg's fixed-point theorem in 5 , there exists x * ∈ S 1 X such that x * ∈ G x * . It follows that x * ∈ S 1 X and x * t ∈ ϕ t, x * ν-a.e. Thus, we have that x * ∈ S 1 X and x * t, ω ∈ G t, ω, x * μ-a.e., ν-a.e.
By assumption A.4 a , it follows that x * t, ω / ∈ A ∩ P t, ω, x * , then we have that x * / ∈ U and x * t, ω ∈ A t, ω, x * .
Therefore, for υ-a.e. 1 x * t, ω ∈ A t, ω, x * μ-a.e., 2 A t, ω, x * ∩ P t, ω, x * ∅μ-a.e.
If there exists a selector F for A ∩ P such that it has measurable graph and it is weakly upper semicontinuous in the third argument, we obtain the following theorem. A.5 a there exists a selector F : S 1 X → 2 Y for A ∩ P : S 1 X → 2 Y such that for each x ∈ S 1 X , F ·, ·, x has measurable graph and for each t, ω ∈ T × Ω, F t, ω, · : U t,ω → 2 Y is weakly upper semicontinuous with closed and convex values.
5.3
For each x ∈ S 1 X , the correspondence G ·, ·, x has a measurable graph. By assumption A4 b , the set U t,ω {x ∈ S 1 X : A t, ω, x ∩ P t, ω, x / ∅} is weakly open in S 1 X . For each t, ω ∈ T × Ω, G t, ω, · : S 1 X → 2 Y is upper semicontinuous. Let V be weakly open in S 1 X and x ∈ S 1 X :
5.4
W is an open set, because U t,ω is open, Φ t, ω, · is a upper semicontinuous map on U t,ω , and the set {x ∈ S 1 X : G t, ω, x ⊂ V } is open since G t, ω, · is u.s.c. Moreover, G is convex and nonempty valued.
Define the correspondence ϕ : T ×S 1 X → 2 L 1 μ,Y by ϕ t, x { y t ∈ L 1 μ, Y : y t, ω ∈ G t, ω, x μ-a.e.} ∩ S 1 X t . By the measurability lifting theorem Theorem 2.13 , the correspondence t → { y t ∈ L 1 μ, Y : y t, ω ∈ G t, ω, x μ-a.e.} has a measurable graph and so does t → S 1 X t by A.4 . Thus, for each fixed x ∈ S 1 X , ϕ ·, x has a measurable graph. Since for each fixed x ∈ S 1 X , G ·, ·, x has a measurable graph and it is nonempty valued, then by the Aumann measurable selection theorem, it admits a measurable selection and we can conclude that ϕ is nonempty valued. It follows by the u.s.c. lifting theorem that for each fixed t, ϕ t, · is weakly u.s.c.
Define G : S 1 X → 2 S 1 X , by G x { y ∈ S 1 X : y t ∈ ϕ t, x ν-a.e.}.
